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To determine whether the products of the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) are worthwhile,
they must be measured against some form of output. The
Prepositioned War Reserve (PWR) of the Marine Corps is a
measure of sustainability: a desired output of the PPBS.
This thesis investigated the PPBS, the Marine Corps
programming methodology and ammunition requirement
generation to determine whether these processes
artificially constrain ammunition purchases.
This thesis suggests that the constraints placed on
ammunition requirements are related to the lack of long-
range strategic goals, inadequate planning in the PPBS and
the inherent weaknesses of program budgeting.
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Under the assumption that resources are scarce,
resource allocation in the Department of Defense is a
complex process fraught with politics, heated competition
and passionate advocacy. In an attempt to optimize the use
of scarce resources, the objectives of the resource
allocation system are divided into "four pillars" of
defense: readiness, sustainability, modernization, and
force structure. The DoD uses the Planning, Programming
and Budgeting System to allocate resources with the goal of
providing to the services the most capable mix of forces at
the minimum cost. All competing initiatives must
contribute to one of these outputs. Invariably, the
competition for scarce resources results in tradeoffs
between the "four pillars" :
Readiness--the ability of forces to fight with little
or no warning.
Sustainability—the staying power of forces in combat.
Modernization—the degree that new technologies are
incorporated into the forces.
Force Structure—the personnel and equipment that will
prosecute the battle.
Clearly, the four outputs do not have finite limits that
can be attained and then left alone while resources are
devoted to other outputs.
Therefore, the entire resource allocation process can
be thought of as a process of deciding how to best balance
the allocation of resources among these four areas.
The scenarios and contingencies against which our
forces may be pitted are limited only by the imagination.
The question is "Does the mix of readiness, sustainability,
modernization, and force structure that one possesses give
one the requisite flexibility to respond successfully to
the greatest number of contingencies?". The answer to
this question is not "yes" or "no". Scenarios must be
generated, analysis performed, issues reviewed and an
estimate of the level of risk determined. This is the area
where closest scrutiny and analysis should be focused.
This thesis is an analysis of the tradeoffs within the
Marine Corps among readiness, sustainability and
modernization
.
The Marine Corps historically has an excellent record
of making the most of its resources. In short, it delivers
a large "bang for the buck". To achieve this reputation,
the Marine Corps has usually stressed readiness because it
is the foundation upon which the Corps' mission rests. If,
at any time, the Marine Corps were found to be ill-prepared
or otherwise not ready to execute its mission, it may have
to justify its existence to an ever-skeptical bureaucracy.
For years the Marine Corps performed its mission with off-
the-shelf hardware procured through the Navy and the Army.
The last 15-20 years have seen a dramatic increase in the
2
number of programs that are Marine Corps unique like
the AV-8 Harrier aircraft and programs that the Marine
Corps is the principal buyer like the V-22 Osprey "tilt-
rotor" .
The Marine Corps is definitely thinking in terms of
future modernization. Modernization emphasizes new
technologies and hardware. However, an increasing emphasis
on modernization means sustainability may be negatively
affected. Consequently, the question this thesis poses is
to what extent does the Marine Corps programming process
and its product the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM)
bypass future sustainability in the form of Prepositioned
War Reserves ( PWR ) of ammunition in favor of current
capability/readiness in the form of ammunition expenditure
on training and employment?
B . BACKGROUND
Ammunition is purchased by the Marine Corps under the
Procurement, Marine Corps (PMC) appropriation. The
aggregate "ammunition" account is broken into 14 functional
subcategories that compete separately for a share of the
resources alloted to ammunition in the PPBS. Generally,
the Marine Corps can do one of two things with its
ammunition resources: use them for training and employment
or store them as part of the Prepositioned War Reserve. No
higher authority tells the Marine Corps how much ammunition
it can expend for training and exercises and how much to
devote to the Prepositioned War Reserve on a yearly basis.
3
The current Defense Guidance issued by the Secretary of
Defense only sets a target of 60 days of ammunition for all
subcategories by FY 94. The number of days and the target
date can be changed, and unless pressure is exerted on the
services to meet this goal the targets may change. In
order to achieve this goal, each service must program
resources in future years to ammunition in sufficient
amounts to cover their planned current needs (training
etc. ) and make marginal increases to any ammunition
categories that fall below the 60 day requirement. Should
the Marine Corps deviate much from the planned level of
training, it would have to take resources from the PWR to
cover the current shortages. Obviously, if the decision
makers in the Marine Corps want to emphasize readiness,
then the PWR totals may actually experience negative growth
and be even further away from their goal
.
The key tradeoff becomes one of readiness. Should the
Marine Corps train hard and possibly let the PWR slip or
should it cut back on training and devote more future
dollars to the war reserves?
This is just one of the tough decisions that must be
made by Marine Corps leaders, and the one certainty is that
there will not be enough resources to satisfy with both the
readiness and the sustainability needs of the Corps.
Not only is the target number of days required in the
PWR debatable, but also the amounts of ammunition in each
category must be derived from some source. The model used
4
to determine the estimates of the usage rates during those
60 days is also a critical factor.
The general impression, then, is that any attempts at
estimating how much ammunition the Marine Corps needs to
have in reserve and how long that reserve will sustain the
forces is fraught with uncertainty. It becomes much easier
and "painless" to focus on the present and brush aside the
future as being too nebulous to warrant serious attention.
The process used to make these hard choices is the
Marine Corps POM. Before fully understanding the status of
ammunition as a separate, competing POM initiative, one
must understand the programming process. The POM is the
environment within which ammunition initiatives must
struggle for resources. The Marine Corps programs in a
manner best suited to its needs. No authority tells the
Marine Corps how to decide which programs to submit to the
Secretary of Defense for possible inclusion in the
President's Budget.
It is this unique process that will get the majority of
attention in this thesis and the ammunition account will be
used to highlight the performance of this process in
relation to its stated goals.
C. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES
In relation to the PPBS as a whole, this thesis will be
confined to the programming phase in the Marine Corps.
Within the POM process, ammunition will be singled out as a
competing initiative for closer scrutiny. The
Prepositioned War Reserve will be used to illustrate the
performance of the POM process in relation to a tangible
output: sustainability.
This thesis will discuss the POM and inputs to the
process in an unclassified manner. None of the figures,
graphs or examples in this thesis were taken from
classified sources.
The stated objective of this thesis is to analyze the
PPBS in general and specifically the Marine Corps POM
process to ascertain how perceived strengths and weaknesses
of both resource allocation tools affect a specific output
— sustainability.
To simply ask "Does the PPBS constrain PWR ammunition
requirements?" would be rhetorical. The function of the
PPBS is to pare the unconstrained planning figures of the
services down into something affordable yet useful.
The products of the PPBS are the Defense Budget and the
Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). As an item in the budget,
the ammunition account is also merely a product of the
system. But does this product contribute to an increase
in the flexibility of the service's ability to counter the
threat? This question can and should be debated, but can
not be answered with absolute certainty. By focusing on
an output (sustainability) and the tradeoff with another
output (readiness) a better understanding of resource
allocation and its inherent problems is attained.
D. METHODOLOGY
To accomplish the objective, first a review of formal
structures of both the PPBS and the Marine Corps POM
process was necessary. As stated previously, every
service programs differently and an understanding of the
Marine Corps method was critical to achieving the
objective.
Because the PWR would serve as an indicator of output,
several questions directly related to ammunition
initiatives were investigated. Specifically, the manner by
which the Marine Corps determines the amounts of ammunition
needed for the PWR was researched. Once accomplished, a
closer look at how the Marine Corps approached the
programming of ammunition was required. To do this, the
POM 90/91-94 strategy employed to help the initiative
successfully compete was reviewed to reveal more of the
"real" side of programming vice the formal structure
already covered.
With this knowledge at hand, the PPBS was critiqued
along with the Marine Corps POM process. Finally, the
issue of sustainability as it relates to ammunition was
analyzed to determine how the trends in ammunition
procurement may adversely affect the ability of the Marine
Corps to successfully respond to a future contingency.
E. ORGANIZATION
Chapter II explains the PPBS and the Marine Corps POM
process as background information. Chapter III discusses
generation of the PWR ammunition requirements and details
the POM 90/91-94 process at Headquarters Marine Corps using
ammunition as a specific example. Chapter IV critiques the
PPBS and the Marine Corps POM process. The results of
this analysis are then applied to the tradeoff between
readiness and sustainability as they relate to ammunition.
Chapter V contains the conclusions of the author regarding
the Marine Corps POM and PWR ammunition requirements drawn
from the material presented in the thesis.
II. BACKGROUND
A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PPBS
The Department of Defense ( DoD ) Planning, Programming,
and Budgeting System (PPBS) is a resource management
system. Introduced in 1961 under then Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara, the PPBS was adopted by President Johnson
for use by all executive agencies in 1965. While the
system has since been dropped by the other executive
agencies, it remains the framework for DoD resource
allocation. The PPBS is a cyclical process that
dynamically proceeds from threat assessment to forces in
being. This is accomplished in the following manner:
Threat assessment leads to the development of strategies to
counter the perceived threat. To support the strategies,
requirements are developed which initiate programs to
fulfill the requirement. Once a balanced mix of programs
is achieved, the budgeting of funds is accomplished to
physically procure the programs. The preceding was a gross
simplification of the PPBS, and the rest of this discussion
will better explain this process by focusing on each of the
three distinct phases: planning, programming, and
budgeting. Figure 2-1 illustrates these three phases and
synopsizes events within them.
PPBS
BUDGETING : PLANNING!
expresseiTas \«assess the threat
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Figure 2-1. The Phases of the PPBS
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1 . Planning
The planning phase identifies the threat facing the
nation during the next 5-20 years, assesses our capability
to counter it, and recommends the forces necessary to
defeat it. Planning highlights critical needs and examines
risks if recommended goals are not attained in order to
guide resource decisions. [Ref. l:p. 3]
The planning phase begins with the formulation of
national security policy through the National Security
Council system and is implemented via National Security
Decision Directives. The key documents during this phase
are the Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal (JLRSA), the
Joint Strategic Planning Document (JSPD), the Draft Defense
Guidance, and finally the Defense Guidance (DG). The JLRSA
is the transitional document from long-range to mid-range
strategic planning. It provides a general framework for
broad force structure implications and assesses military
policies, plans and programs that have mid- or long-range
implications. Lastly, this document acts as the catalyst
to more sharply focus strategic studies. [Ref. l:p. 14]
The JSPD is a comprehensive military appraisal of
threats to U.S. interests and objectives. It contains a
statement of recommended military objectives and strategies
to attain national objectives. The JSPD also contains an
appraisal of capabilities and risks associated with
programmed force levels and changes where appropriate.
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This document is used in the development of the Draft
Defense Guidance. [Ref. l:p. 15]
The Draft Defense Guidance is issued to solicit
comments on major issues, problem areas and resource
constraints that may interfere with the development and
programming of forces to execute desired policy and
strategy.
The output of the planning phase is the final
version of the DG which is issued by SecDef. It is an
authoritative statement which directs defense policy,
strategy, force and resource planning, and provides fiscal
guidance for the development of Program Objectives
Memoranda (POM). Fiscal guidance in the DG is given at
Total Obligational Authority (TOA) levels for each of the
next five years. The services use the DG to develop their
individual POM's, while the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS ) use DG as
a baseline for program review. [Ref. l:p. 18]
2. Programming
The programming phase matches available dollars
against the most critical needs and develops a five-year
resource proposal. After this proposal is approved, it
becomes the basis for budgeting action. [Ref. l:p. 3]
Each service submits a POM in response to DG,
matching money and manpower to programs over each of the
next five years. The POM delineates the resource
location decisions that each service has made in response
12
to Defense Guidance. It reflects the impact of any areas
of reduced resources, proposes new initiatives, and
delineates options for the use of additional funds
(referred to as over guidance). The POM is presented in
ten major programs:
- Support of Other Nations
1 - Strategic Forces
2 - General Purpose Forces
3 - Intelligence and Communications
4 - Airlift and Sealift
5 - Guard and Reserve Forces
6 - Research and Development
7 - Central Supply / Maintenance
8 - Training, Medical, Other General Personnel
Activities
9 - Administration and Associated Activities
The major programs are mission oriented aggregates, each
built of many program elements (PE's) which are classified
under one of the major programs. The individual service's
POM's are first reviewed by JCS, which provides the SecDef
with an assessment of
a. the adequacy/capability of the total programmed force
to meet national goals and
b. the shortcomings of the proposed force.
This assessment is made via the Joint Program Assessment
Memorandum (JPAM). This document compares the programmed
force (POM's) to the minimum risk force envisioned in the
JSPD.
13
Due to overlap and/or duplication, alternatives to
a POM proposal may arise. Any Defense Resources Board
(DRB) member or CINC may propose topics for development
into issues for further DRB consideration. From these
proposed issues a number are selected and assigned to one
of eight issue books. The full DRB meets to discuss the
issues and measures them against DG, against available
resources, and management initiatives. The DRB decisions
are recorded in a set of Program Decision Memoranda (PDM)
and transmitted to each service, approving their POM as
modified. The PDM is the services guidance for budget
submission. A clear distinction should be made here as to
the difference between the POM and the budget. Although a
program must be in the POM to get into the budget, they are
not alike. The purpose of the POM is to assign prices to
the programs that planners deem necessary. The programming
phase deals with estimates of fiscal guidance and
wishlists. The budgeting phase is where fiscal reality
sets in and the trade-offs are made that become the budget,
and therefore law. [Ref. 2:p. 2-2]
3. Budgeting
The budgeting phase refines the detailed costs and
develops the service estimate required to accomplish the
approved program. Following review and approval, it
serves as the input to the President's Budget. [Ref.
l:p. 3]
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This final phase translates the products of the
planning and programming phases into annual funding
requirements. Calls for Budget Estimates are issued by
individual services in response to the POM, decision
documents, and fiscal guidance. SecDef normally receives
budget submissions on 15 September for analysis. As a
result of the analyses, budget hearings are held jointly
with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The
products of these hearings are the SecDef s Program Budget
Decisions ( PBD ) . After issuance of the PBD's, the services
and JCS have another opportunity to comment before the
Budget Estimate is finalized and sent to OMB for inclusion
in the President's Budget. The publication of the
President's Budget concludes the budgeting phase of PPBS.
[Ref. 3:p. 13-14] Figure 2-2 graphically depicts the
PPBS.
4. Summary of PPBS
There are few critics of the PPBS that would
propose abolishing this resource allocation process. To do
so would create utter chaos in the DoD as well as the
defense industry. However, the system is dynamic and
evolves in response to specific management styles of the
incumbent administration and improvements initiated by its
participants when the efficient management of resources is
hampered. Many perceived problems with PPBS were addressed
in a memorandum issued by then Deputy Secretary of Defense
Frank Carlucci in March of 1981 and have since been
15
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corrected. There will always be strident criticisms of the
PPBS as it continues to seek some sort of equilibrium that
satisfies its players and the decision makers in accordance
with their diverse interests and motivations. These
criticisms include inadequate planning, unrealistic
relationship between planning and fiscal constraints and
too little emphasis on outputs. These and other weaknesses
of PPBS will be covered in detail in Chapter Four. An
excellent overview of PPBS along with current trends,
perceived weaknesses, and recommendations for remedying the
weaknesses can be found in Reference 4.
5. The Five Year Defense Plan
The products of the PPBS are the Defense Budget and
the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP). To better understand
the PPBS in relation to this thesis, the FYDP needs to be
explained further. This document summarizes the forces and
resources that are associated with the programs approved by
SecDef in the various decision documents previously
discussed. The FYDP contains data for prior year (PY),
current year (CY), budget year (BY), and BY+1, +2, +3, and+4.
For forces only, the FYDP contains data out to BY+7 years.
The FYDP is composed of ten major defense programs to
facilitate internal DoD program review. As a second, added
dimension for review, it is structured via the
Congressional appropriation structure. This two-
dimensional structure provides a comprehensive approach to
accounting for, estimating, identifying, and allocating
17
resources to the program elements. Figure 2-3 lists the
ten major programs and the appropriation categories used to
balance the output-oriented internal review structure
against the input-oriented Congressional review structure.
[Ref. 5]
B. THE MARINE CORPS POM PROCESS
Before the issue of ammunition requirements can be
addressed, a concise overview of the Marine Corps POM
process is necessary. As previously discussed, the POM is
the key document developed by the services during the
programming phase of the PPBS. The Department of the Navy
(DON) has two component services: the Navy Department and
the Marine Corps. DON submits one POM, and it is composed
of separate submissions from both the Navy Department and
the Marine Corps. This section will explain the general
process used by the Marine Corps to produce its POM for
inclusion in the DON POM. Although the format and content
of the service POM's are similar, each service makes its
resource allocation decisions in its own unique manner.
The preceding statement serves as a caveat so the reader
does not assume that all POM's are developed in the same
manner as the Marine Corps '
.
To best illustrate the biennial POM process, this
discussion will use 1990 as its hypothetical Budget Year
and track the formulation of the POM. This POM would be
referred to as "POM 90/91-94", with 91-94 symbolizing the
out-years. For a graphic representation of Marine Corps
18
INPUT ORIENTED CATEGORIES
1. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)
2. Procurement
3. Military Construction
4. Operation and Maintenance
5. Military Personnel Dollars
OUTPUT ORIENTED PROGRAMS
1. Strategic Forces
2. General Purpose Forces
3. Intelligence and Communications
4. Airlift and Sealift
5. Guard and Reserve Forces
6. Research and Development
7. Central Supply and Maintenance
8. Training, Medical, and Other Personnel Activities
9. Administration and Associated Activities
0. Support of Other Nations
Figure 2-3 FYDP PROGRAMS AND APPROPRIATIONS
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POM development, refer to Figure 2-4 throughout the
following discussion.
Before describing the step-by-step process, definitions
of groups/committees which make key decisions and trade-
offs are necessary.
1. POM Working Group (PWG) :
A group with representatives from all sponsors
which meets as necessary to work out differences in
resource allocation. This group is made up primarily of
field grade (0-4 and 0-5) officers. [Ref. 6]
2. POM Coordinating Group (PCG) :
The PCG consists of one and two-star generals and
meets for the same reason as the PWG, only with less
frequency. When the PCG reviews and comments on the POM,
it is sent back to the PWG for action. [Ref. 6]
3. Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps Committee
( ACMC )
:
This three- and four-star level committee reviews
and comments on the POM also. Any issues are referred to
the PCG and PWG. The ACMC Committee presents the final
version of the POM to the Commandant of the Marine Corps
(CMC) and, unless he has any problems with it, the POM is
signed and sent to DON. [Ref. 6]
Figure 2-5 illustrates the relationships between
these three groups.
The Requirements and Programs ( R&P ) Division of
Headquarters Marine Corps has cognizance of the Marine



































































































































branch conducts analysis prior to a programs inclusion in
the POM and makes sure that all requisite tests and
milestones are being accomplished as scheduled. The
Program component oversees POM development and tracks
prior, current and future POM's. When the PWG meets, it is
chaired by R&P. The presentation of the POM to the PCG and
the ACMC Committee is done by R&P also.
None of these groups work in a vacuum. To prevent
needless work and unexpected surprises, advance
notification of problems with a particular area or program
is usually given. In fact, the members of the PWG have
counterparts on the PCG and all parties prefer the bulk of
the allocation process to take place at the PWG level. The
PWG makes decisions that restructure spending profiles,
delay program start-up and vary the quantity of
procurements. The PCG confines itself mainly to serious
differences with the POM as developed by the PWG. As a
result, most analysis and in depth study of programs are
done at the PWG level.
4. POM Development
POM development can be separated into three
mutually-supporting phases. Phase I assesses current
program. For POM 90, Phase I began in August of 1986 with
the Summer Planning Conference. Included in this phase are
update briefings of the current threat and amphibious
strategy in November of 1986.
23
During Phase II, the Force Commanders and Marine
Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) warfighting sponsors assess
the mission and capabilities, and weigh the effectiveness
of this capability against future requirements. These
assessments occured between January and June of 1987. A
summary assessment is developed by R&P and concludes this
phase. After the warfighting assessments are complete, the
nuts-and-bolts of preliminary POM development begins. The
objective of the POM development process is to provide the
most cost effective, capable, and ready Marine Corps
attainable within current resource constraints. [Ref. 7]
Core development is the analysis of all current
capability programs. The goal during core development is
to ascertain the amount of resources required to continue
funding profiles of programs already approved in prior
POM's that are in various stages of procurement. The
Marine Corps bases their estimate on the "best guess" of
what fiscal guidance will be via dialogue with the Marine
Corps Fiscal Division, NAVCOMPT, and OSD. Once a solid
figure is determined which will cover all current
capability programs, an amount is added for discretionary
funds which will be used to initiate new programs or
augment existing ones as desired. For example: if the
Marine Corps decides that $7.5 Billion will cover current
capability, it may use $8.0 Billion as a planning figure,
allowing $500 Million for discretionary funding. At this
point the planners assume that they will get enough funding
24
to cover the "core" and commence the decision process that
will decide where the Marine Corps will allocate its
discretionary funds. Again, they assume for now that they
will get the entire amount added for discretionary
purposes. Core development for POM 90 occured in September
- October of 1987. [Ref. 8]
As the core is developed, R&P begins issuing the
POM Serials which relay CMC guidance, outline POM
development methodology, promulgate administrative
instructions and give the structure for initiatives.
(Initiatives are formal documents giving justification for
the inclusion of a program in the POM. Section C of this
chapter details the contents of an initiative. ) Initiatives
for POM 90 were submitted between November 1987 and January
1988. Initiatives are reviewed by the Landing Force
Configuration Board (LFCG) to ensure programs fit into the
MAGTF doctrine. [Ref. 8]
In December of 1987, Defense Guidance 90/91-94 was
published. This contains the first formal fiscal guidance
that may constrain POM development. Issuance of DG/fiscal
guidance coincides with the prioritization of initiatives
in the Marine Corps. The entire process takes on a
different light as a result of differences between the
planning figure used during core development and the figure
issued via DG. If there were no difference, the process
would continue as planned. However, fiscal guidance could
be a figure that is
25
a. somewhere between the core figure and the planning
figure or
b. equal to or below the core figure.
In either case, marginal programs in the core and all
initiatives must be prioritized to see which ones are most
valuable to the Marine Corps and the execution of its
mission. The prioritization process is very dynamic and
subject to changes in force structure and fiscal review.
Section D of this chapter is a thorough discussion of the
Program Evaluation Group (PEG) and its method of
prioritizing initiatives.
The period from January until May of 1988 is for
final development of POM 90. Final CMC guidance was
formulated and issued in January and February of 1988. The
Blue/Green Split is also issued in February of 1988. This
allocates to the Marine Corps its portion of the DON FYDP
for use in final POM development and submission. POM 90 is
reviewed and analyzed by the PWG, PCG and ACMC Committee
and finally signed by CMC and submitted for inclusion in
DON's POM in May of 1988. OSD reviews the POM's during
June through August of 1988 and SecDef issues the Program
Decision Memorandum in August of 1988. Figure 2-6 is a
chronology of the Marine Corps POM development process as
explained earlier. [Ref. 8]
C. PROCUREMENT INITIATIVES
The purpose of this section is to describe the two




1. Program 88/89-92 Sep 86
Assessment
2. Intel Threat Brief Nov 86
3. Amphib Strategy Brief Nov 86
PHASE II
4. Force Commanders Jan 87
Warfighting Analysis
5. MAGTF Warfighting Feb 87
Capability Assessments














CORE Development Sep-Oct 87
POM Serials Sep-Nov 87
POM Development Sep 87 - May 88
Initiatives Submitted Nov 87 - Jan 88
DG 90/91-94 Issued Dec 87
Final POM Development Jan - May 88
Blue/Green Split Issued Feb 88
Final CMC Guidance Jan - Feb 88
POM 90/91-94 Submitted May 88
OSD Review (DRB) Jun - Aug 88
Program Decision Aug 88
Memorandum
Figure 2-6: Marine Corps POM 90/91-94 Biennial
Development Schedule
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of each. The two general types are the standard
Procurement Initiative and the Procurement Initiative For
MMPM Core Increase. Before enumerating the contents of
each type, some background information is necessary. If a
program has never been in the POM before, and therefore not
in the defense budget, it must be submitted for rigorous
scrutiny within the Marine Corps to ensure it meets the
necessary criteria to warrant allocation of scarce
resources. Part of this process is a formal Procurement
Initiative. Once a program has gone through this process,
it becomes part of the Material Management Programming
Model (MMPM). In a way, the MMPM is the "core". It
manages a program's spending profile over its life.
However, if a sponsor wishes to increase any of the amounts
in a particular program's funding profile that is already
in the MMPM it must submit a Procurement Initiative For
MMPM Core Increase. These requests must compete with any
other core increase requests and all of the new initiatives
for a portion of the discretionary dollars. Requests for
core increase need not be in the form of a lump sum and are
often requested in parts (called "bands") and each band
competes separately for discretionary dollars. This
strategy increases the odds of getting at least some of the
resources that are desired. [Ref. 9]
1 . Program Initiative
The best approach to this section is to list the
main subsections of a Procurement Initiative and include
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explanations whenever appropriate. The source of this
information on program initiatives is Reference 10.
a. Identification--This section includes the name of
the item, point s -o f -contact , and the MMROP
identification number. (The Marine Corps Mid-Range
Objectives Plan (MMROP) is a planning document that
prioritizes Marine Corps mid-range objectives.
)
b. Justification--This section summarizes the following
key questions: What will the initiative (program) do?
What will the initiative replace? What improvement in
capability will this initiative provide? What will
the impact be if this initiative is not acquired or
the proposed change made? Is this initiative
dependent on other systems/items?
c. Expected Service Life
d. Table of Organization/Table of Equipment
Implications
e. Transients, Trainees, Training Overhead
Implications
f. Amphibious Lift Fingerprint--All initiatives are
entered into the MAGTF Lift Model data base for
analysis and review by the Landing Force
Configuration Board.
g. Communications Security (COMSEC) Requirements
h. Facilities—This section asks questions regarding
the building of new facilities, renovation of
existing facilities, and Military Construction
(MILCON) funding requirements.
i. Required Documentation—This section lists all of
the documentary milestones required by the particular




Current Development and Test Status
k. Production/Pricing Information
1. Alternative of Competitive Systems
m. Preplanned Block Upgrades
n. Estimated Savings—If approval of this program will
result in reductions to previous budgets, the savings
are estimated and entered.
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o. Cost Data--Data is divided into specific
appropriations and profiled for the Budget Year, the
out-years, to completion, and the totaled.
2. Procurement Initiative For MMPM Core Increase
This document, also called a "one-pager", is simple
and concise. The source of the information in this section
is Reference 11. It consists of the following four
sections.
a. Identification--Same information as given in the
Procurement Initiative.
b. Current MMPM Core Profile
c. Revised MMPM Core Profile
d. Justification
D. MARINE CORPS PRIORITIZATION PROCESS
This section will describe the prioritization of
initiatives during Marine Corps POM development. Included
in this discussion are an overview of the prioritization
process, the role and functions of the Sponsor's Program
Evaluation Group (PEG), and an illustrative example of the
pair-wise comparison method of prioritization.
1. Overview of the Prioritization Process
The objective of the prioritization process is to
enumerate all competing initiatives and assign a relative
value to the Marine Corps. Once accomplished, trade-offs
and/or cuts can be made with minimum loss to the Marine
Corps as fiscal constraints become a reality. The
prioritization of initiatives takes place at two levels:
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First the initiatives within the purview of each sponsor
must be prioritized, then the lists from all of the
sponsors are prioritized relative to each other. This
results in a list of all initiatives with their
corresponding value to the Marine Corps. The first
prioritization is accomplished by the Sponsor's PEG, and
the second is done by the Marine Corps PEG. After the
Marine Corps PEG produces its final list, the
prioritization process is complete.
2. Role of the Sponsor's Program Evaluation Group
Although this section centers on the Sponsor's PEG,
the same functions and roles can be carried over to the
Marine Corps PEG. The Sponsor's PEG is a group of Marine
Corps officers whose professional military judgments are
used by a sponsor to estimate the relative priority of its
POM initiatives. The sponsor chooses these officers to
acquire a broad background of experience and knowledge
across various specialties. A PEG normally has at least
five members and no more than nine. Like the POM Working
Group, the members are usually majors and lieutenant
colonels. To accomplish an informed prioritization,
members must have a thorough knowledge of the Summary
Warfighting Assessment and the Marine Corps Mid-Range
Objectives Plan (MMROP). These two documents give the
group requisite knowledge of deficiencies in warfighting
capabilities and the desired direction of the Marine Corps
respectively. Before the Sponsor PEG can make decisions
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about initiatives, it must be educated about the merits of
each one. A day or more of briefings and study is used to
ensure the PEG has the opportunity to consider each
initiative based on its benefit to the Marine Corps. After
sufficient education, the PEG is ready to conduct a closed
session under non-attribution rules to produce a single
list of the sponsor's initiatives and their relative value
to the sponsor. A representative from the R&P Division is
present to assist the PEG in determining relative
priorities but is not part of the briefing process.
Although matrix theory, algorithms, and other analytical
techniques are used, the judgement of the officers in the
PEG is the foundation of the process. The final list is
sent to the sponsor for approval. Once the sponsor
approves the list, it is submitted to R&P Division for
cross-sponsor evaluation by the Marine Corps PEG. The next
section explains the method used for cross-section
evaluation. [Ref. 12]
3. Pair-wise Comparison
To best represent the pair-wise comparison
technique, a generic example with three sponsors will be
used: Red, Blue, and Green. Initiatives are labeled with
letters: A, B, C etc. To simplify the example, each sponsor
has only five competing initiatives. The table below is a
hypothetical output of the three Sponsor PEG's. The range
of possible values was to 100.
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B 70 G 80 L 70
C 50 H 40 M 60
D 40 I 35 N 40
E 10 J 20 30
Note: Initiatives submitted to Marine Corps PEG: A, C, E,
F, H, J, K, M, and 0.
The next step is the Marine Corps PEG'S cross-
sponsor evaluation. To avoid the laborious task of
prioritizing all initiatives of all sponsors, only the top,
middle, and bottom initiative from each sponsor is sent to
the Marine Corps PEG as indicated by the note at the bottom
of Table 2-1.
The three initiatives from the three sponsors
(total of nine) are then prioritized into a single list,
with a relative value assigned to each. This list is also
used to generate the factor by which all initiatives will
be multiplied. The output of this prioritization is shown
in Table 2-2 below.
The factors in Table 2 are then applied to the
original, entire sponsor lists. Using Red as an example,
the sponsor value of A (100) is multiplied by its factor of
.80 resulting in a Marine Corps Value of 80. All Red
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initiatives between the top and the middle initiative are
multiplied by the same factor: .80. Red's middle
initiative (C) is multiplied by its Marine Corps PEG factor
(.50) giving it a Marine Corps Value of 25. Again, all
values between Red's middle initiative and its last
initiative are multiplied by the same factor of .50.
TABLE 2-2. PRIORITIZATION FROM MARINE CORPS PEG










Finally, Red's last initiative is multiplied by its factor
of .20, resulting in a Marine Corps Value of 2. The same
multiplication by factors is done to all sponsors, with the
result given in Table 2-3.
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TABLE 2-3. RELATIVE VALUES ASSIGNED BY MARINE CORPS PEG
RED BLUE GREEN
Initiative Value Initiative Value Initiative Value
A 80 F 85.5 K 100
B 56 G 76 L 70
C 25 H 28 M 39
D 20 I 24.5 N 26
E 2 J 6 12
Note: The values in this table represent Marine Corps
values vice the Sponsor values in Table 2-1.
Finally, the initiatives from all sponsors can be
placed in one list according to their Marine Corps Value
and this list is used as a basis for decisions during the
POM process in response to fiscally constrained guidance.
[Ref. 13]
Although this is a very simplified example, it is
the essence of the method the Marine Corps uses to
prioritize all of the competing initiatives. Lists are not
always forthcoming and a lot of discussion takes place
before final lists evolve that satisfy the PEG's and the
sponsors.
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In summary, this chapter has reviewed the PPBS as a
whole, focusing on the Marine Corps method of programming.
With this background established, the current POM and the
status of ammunition as a competing initiative can be
understood. The next chapter discusses ammunition
requirement generation and the ongoing POM process.
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III. GENERATION OF AMMUNITION REQUIREMENTS
A. GENERAL
As explained in the introductory chapter, the
Prepositioned War Reserve (PWR) is handled separately from
ammunition for training and employment. Ammunition
requirements are monitored in the Ground Combat section of
the Plans, Programs and Operations Division at Headquarters
Marine Corps. The oversight of the PWR can be split into
two phases: Requirement generation and Programming. During
the generation of the ammunition requirement, the objective
is to determine how much ammunition is required to meet the
perceived threat as dictated by OSD, JCS, and Marine Corps
planners. As expected, the Marine Corps uses a model (the
Class V(W) methodology) to arrive at usage rates for the
various types of ammunition it will utilize in combat.
These rates are then applied to a specific scenario to
determine the requisite quantities of munitions necessary
to win. Section B of this chapter will detail the Class
V(W) methodology and discuss some of the criticisms of this
model. Section C covers the recent performance of Marine
Corps Ammunition Account as an initiative in the POM in
general and specifically how the account has competed
during POM 90/91-94 which will be finalized and submitted
to the DON by May of 1988.
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The intent of this chapter is to build on the
foundation of information covered in chapter two by
discussing the generation of the ammunition requirement and
focusing on its output: the competing ammunition
initiatives in the Marine Corps POM.
B. REQUIREMENT GENERATION
The Marine Corps Class V(W) methodology was first
developed in 1981. This model determines the rates of
ammunition usage expected in combat and therefore drives
the generation of desired war reserves (PWR) to have on
hand in the event of actual conventional combat. Several
studies have focused on this methodology with the intent of
ensuring the rates are realistic and useful since the
possible success of forces in battle may depend on adequate
war reserves of ammunition. Before discussing the actual
model, the assumptions which underlie it must be revealed.
The Class V(W) methodology uses a non-nuclear, simulated
conflict of 180 days as its only scenario. For simplicity,
the model is static and employs passive, one-sided force
analysis. The conflict is already "won" by friendly
forces, the threat forces are fixed in size and
composition, and the ammunition requirement is estimated on
the basis of killing 100 percent of the threat force. [Ref.
14]
With these assumptions in mind, the reader should refer





































































































Class V(W) methodology. Analysis of the methodology by
Advanced Computer Systems, Inc. is ongoing and Reference 14
explains each of the 27 steps in greater detail. Although
the analysis is very interesting and informative, it is
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, highlights of
the conclusions and recommendations are worth discussing.
In Ref. 14, the Class V(W) methodology was praised for its
simplicity and efficiency, but at the expense of validity
and realism. By utilizing a single scenario, the combat
planning rates (CPR's) that evolve were viewed as higher-
than-necessary risk for a procurement strategy. The study
recommended three scenarios (one for each Fleet Marine
Force operational area) be used. The model also relies
heavily on U.S. Army ammunition data which may not be
applicable to Marine Corps doctrine. Additionally, the
Troop Population Model also relies heavily on Army data
that is massaged with subjective judgment and again may not
be applicable to the Marine Corps. In summary, it was the
opinion of ACS, Inc. that the model is basically sound, but
weaknesses exist that may adversely affect the CPR's that
emanate from it. It should be pointed out that the views
of ACS Inc. do not necessarily agree with that of the
Marine Corps. This study and some of its findings were
included to underscore the fact that requirement generation
is by no means an exact science.
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A more "realistic" model is being developed and tested
which addresses these and many other perceived weaknesses.
Not surprisingly, early results indicate the need for
higher rates. The focus on rates stems from the direct
relationship between rates and dollars. If those
responsible for the maintenance of the PWR advocate higher
combat planning rates, they must then convince the "honest
brokers" in the R&P Division that the rates are realistic
and that their resultant higher resource requirements
should be given high priority as POM initiatives. As will
be discussed later in this thesis, this argument is very
difficult for ammunition advocates to win.
Although the scenario of 180 days is used to develop
CPR's, the Marine Corps is not required to have 180 days of
ammunition in a reserved status. Until recently the
requirement was 90 days of supply (DOS) at the assault
rate, but in the latest DG this requirement was reduced to
a new goal of 60 DOS by FY 94. The reader may wonder at
this point if the analysis done to generate CPR's is very
valuable when the DOS requirement can be manipulated to
better fit the budget. The author assumes that the 90 day
requirement was deemed unattainable. This was verified by
inspection of current levels of reserve ammunition and the
simple fact that it will be FY 94 before the 60 DOS goal is
reached.
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In summary, the Marine Corps uses the Class V(W)
methodology to develop Combat Planning Rates that are used
to estimate how much ammunition should be stockpiled to
counter the perceived threat. The various types of
ammunition are measured relative to the 60 DOS requirement.
If ammunition dollars in the Procurement Marine Corps (PMC)
appropriation are used for training or employment they can
not be used for the PWR. This trade-off is one of many
that exist in the POM process as it relates to ammunition,
the subject of the next section.
C. PROGRAMMING FOR AMMUNITION
As the last section pointed out, the number that is
developed as an ammunition requirement is somewhat
arguable. With this value, PP&O must develop initiatives
that will cover the "core" for ammunition and also move
positively toward the 60 DOS goal.
Before discussing the POM, a look at how the aggregate
ammunition account has fared between the President's Budget
and the Total Obligational Authority (TOA) appropriated by
Congress would be worthwhile. Figure 3-2 shows the
performance of ammunition in the 1980' s. The point this
graph illustrates is that when money was tight ammunition
got slashed, and when money was loose (83-84) ammunition
improved its position. The degree to which ammunition
suffers or recovers is open to debate, but the general
trend is "normal". [Ref. 15]
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Fiqure 3-2. Marine Corps Ammunition Allocations
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However, a closer look at ammunition through POM 90/91-
94 will highlight the attitudes and approaches used to
evaluate ammunition programming in the Marine Corps.
The aggregate item "ammunition" is subdivided into 14
categories in the Procurement, Marine Corps (PMC)
appropriation account. The subcategories are functionally
oriented (i.e. small arms, mortar, grenades etc.). The
Marine Corps budgets for each of these types separately,
but there is no PWR line item and it is up to the Marine
Corps to devote a percentage of the subcategories resources
to the PWR for maintenance and improvement.
As stated earlier, the PWR competes with training and
employment ammunition requirements for dollars. Therefore,
two items that may have a direct effect on training and
employment (and thus an indirect effect on the PWR) are the
structure of the Marine Corps and changes in planned
consumption of ammunition. If resources are funneled into
training and employment, the PWR may be either held at
current levels or actually decrease in DOS depending on the
size of the increases in current consumption. Ideally,
PP&O would like to get enough money to cover its core plus
enough to absorb any extra training and add to the PWR.
During the initial POM 90 process, the Marine Corps
wanted approximately $9.5 Billion to cover its total core
and, after adding $500 Million for discretionary funding,
used a planning figure of about $10 Billion. When Defense
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Guidance was issued, the Marine Corps received fiscal
guidance of $9.4 Billion. With the $500 Million still
included, it left a new figure of $8.9 Billion to cover the
core. Since the original core of $9.5 Billion could not
be covered, many initiatives previously protected in the
MMPM would have to compete along with new initiatives in
POM development. PP&O figured it would take $256 Million
to cover the ammunition core but was given only $190
Million, a $66 Million decrement. Ammunition would have to
compete with all other initiatives for a share of the $500
Million in discretionary funds to cover the $66 Million
shortfall. Keep in mind that if ammunition competed
successfully for all of the $66 Million it would just cover
its core, implying it would just break even with no extra
consumption or additions to the PWR.
The strategy used by PP&O was to submit five separate
ammunition initiatives (bands), labeled AMMO I through V.
AMMO I and AMMO II were for $33 Million each and if both
were successful would cover the core shortfall of $66
Million. AMMO III - V asked for $25 Million each and would
be used for extra training and the PWR. If AMMO III - V
were all successful, it was estimated they would have
collectively added 1.5 days to the aggregate DOS. Figure
3-3 shows the profile of the total days of ammunition if
the entire POM 90 core of $256 Million was achieved. (Some
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Figure 3-3. Days of Ammunition Profile
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below, this graph is an aggregate to give the reader a
sense of the status of the PWR.
)
As part of the argument in favor of its initiatives, it
was pointed out by PP&O that a decrement below the POM 90
core would cause negative growth of the PWR and hinder the
attainment of the 60 DOS goal given in DG. Additionally,
if more training was conducted and/or a change in Marine
Corps structure executed the effects on the PWR would be
aggravated.
The result of all the effort expended on behalf of the
ammunition account was rather discouraging. Although POM
90 was not finalized, the AMMO I band was the only
initiative that was "successful" in the POM prioritization
process. AMMO I made it on the list of "over-guidance"
initiatives, meaning that if_ funds in excess of the fiscal
guidance became available AMMO I would be part of the
competition for those resources. During fiscally
constrained periods, initiatives on this list of "also-
rans" have very little chance of getting funded. [Ref. 16]
This completes the discussion on ammunition and the
Marine Corps POM process. This chapter has shown how the
ammunition requirement for the PWR is generated and given
the reader some insight on how ammunition competes as an
initiative in the prioritization process.
In summary, the Class V(W) methodology is used to
predict the utilization rates expected in combat for
ammunition. These rates are converted into quantities of
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ammunition and amounts for the PWR are arrived at as goals.
At this time, a dollar value can be attached to the
ammunition initiative. With this requirement, strategies
are formed to make the ammunition initiative competitive.
A synopsis of the current POM process was included in this
chapter to add a dimension of reality to the discussion of
the trade-off process. This example illustrated the
uphill struggle that the PWR faces, and the domination of
readiness considerations over sustainability issues.
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IV. EVALUATION OF THE PPBS AND THE MARINE CORPS POM PROCESS
A. GENERAL
This chapter addresses the problems that are created
with respect to ammunition as an output of the PPBS by that
system. These issues will be covered first by examining
the weaknesses of the PPBS in general, then the
shortcomings of the Marine Corps POM process and finally
the result of these faults will be detailed: the status of
ammunition from the standpoint of sustainability.
It should be stated that the PPBS has been thoroughly
examined and critiqued on numerous occasions in the past.
The President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management in 1986 and the recent passage of the Goldwater-
Nichols DoD Reorganization Act are both current examples
of this ongoing scrutiny. The author does not pretend to
add to this body of knowledge. Rather, it is the intention
of this chapter to make the link between these criticisms
and the sustainability issue.
The purpose of the first section of this chapter is to
present the most pertinent, PPBS related issues and discuss
them in the context of their ineffectiveness at
contributing to one of the "four pillars" of defense.
B. PPBS ISSUES
When the PPBS first came to the DoD in the 1960 's it
was heralded as a "revolution" because it was able to cut
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across the traditional service-oriented lines. Initially,
greatest emphasis was placed on the quantified cost
estimates and the effectiveness of programs. This gave
then Secretary of Defense McNamara and his analysts a
distinct advantage, mainly because this type of analysis
had not been attempted before and none of the services was
equipped to dispute the analysis carried out by OSD. The
initial analysis was ill suited for the area of
conventional forces because of multiple and overlapping
missions. Therefore, conflicts between OSD and the
services over general purpose forces were common.
As the services took a more active role in analysis and
program evaluation, a lot of this previous friction that
existed between them and OSD was reduced. However, there
are more problems with the PPBS than the initial lopsided
ability to judge the benefits of a program.
Supposedly, the PPBS was designed to help the decision
makers better answer the critical question "How much
defense spending is enough?". During the 1960's, the
Kennedy and then the Johnson administrations were
determined to pull away from an over reliance on nuclear
weapons. Challenges to national security were to be met
with "proportional responses". The belief was held that
the United States could not threaten the use of nuclear
weapons in every contingency, and to maintain credibility
the U.S. must develop the conventional might flexible
enough to counter a threat that does not warrant the
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utilization of nuclear forces. Accomplishing this goal
would be expensive, and from the outset it was understood
that minimum cost for maximum capability (minimax) was
crucial to success.
Initially, McNamara had full support of Congress
because it believed in the theory and also because the
Congress was not prepared to dispute the analysts at OSD
either. This friendly environment does not exist today.
Since the inception of PPBS, the role of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) in the executive branch has
expanded considerably. Also the Congress now has its own
analytical capability—the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO)--and has additional staffing on the Budget Committees
in the legislative branch. [Ref. 17:p. 94]
The question of whether the right amount was allocated
for defense can never be answered with absolute certainty,
but it is imperative that the level of risk the U.S. is
willing to accept and estimates of opportunity costs of
defense expenditures receive continual scrutiny lest we
ignore any indicators of neglect.
Since the defense budget currently contains over fifty
percent of the "controllable" or discretionary funds in the
federal budget [Ref. 17:p. 94], it will undoubtedly
continue to negatively absorb changes in government
spending resulting from shifts in fiscal policy. Such
being the case, the following issues hinder the flexibility
of the PPBS and degrade the value of its output.
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1. Ineffective Strategic Planning
The strategic planning conducted during the
planning phase is ineffective at influencing the output of
the PPBS. It has been suggested that the first "P" in PPBS
is silent [Ref. 4:p. 493] for this reason. This particular
criticism exists because long-range resource allocation
planning is not adequately linked to the decisions that
occur in the programming and budgeting phases. The causes
for this weakness begin with the domination of planning by
the latter phases. In fact, while planning is supposed to
direct the subsequent phases of the system, the reverse is
true. The OSD has also been criticized for focusing its
attention primarily on immediate problems, creating this
"tail wagging the dog" effect. Budgeting is the most
present oriented phase. But to get in the budget, a
program must get into the POM. This requires the services
to look ahead, but even the out-years of the POM are
tentative at best and what gets the majority of attention
is the budget year. The critical input of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (the JLRSA and JSPD) often gets ignored in this
competition when it should be the catalyst of the process.
Additionally, it is extremely difficult to arrive at a
consensus among all the players that is a coherent military
strategy. [Ref. 4:p. 493]
The actual process of strategic planning can be
characterized as influencing "programs and resource
allocations. . . in a spasmodic and usually unstructured
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way." [Ref. 4:p. 494] It would seem such a process does
not command much respect within the PPBS if it is indeed so
loosely structured.
2. Relationship Between Planning and Fiscal
Constraints
An inconsistency develops when limited, finite
resources are stretched to cover expanding missions in
response to an ever threatening adversary. Symptomatic of
this situation are the widening gaps between the
recommended planning force, the programmed (POM) force and
the actual capability achieved after Congress acts on the
President's budget. Reasons for these gaps include the
aforementioned planning problems and the fact that planning
is fiscally unconstrained. By developing the JSPD in this
idealistic environment, this phase of the system begs to be
ignored. One may argue that this would be an excellent
source of opportunity costs, but the relationship has
gotten so distorted that its usefulness for this purpose is
minimized. [Ref. 4:p. 497]
3. Unrealistic Fiscal Guidance
The lack of usable fiscal guidance merely results
in the deferment of difficult decisions into the
programming and budgeting phases, thereby adding to their
significance and detracting from that of the earlier
decisions. To reap the full benefit of the PPBS, the
initial fiscal guidance issued by the SecDef in his Defense
Guidance needs to be closer to the amounts eventually
passed by Congress. As the difference between these two
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numbers grows, the need for reassessment of earlier
prioritizing decisions increases, but is seldom if ever
conducted. It simply can not be assumed that the products
of the PPBS (and thus the intended outputs) are not being
detrimentally altered by ever-increasing budget cuts.
Incidentally, unplanned increases in defense spending can
have the same effect on outputs because the extra resources
are not being utilized as efficiently as possible. [Ref.
4:p. 499]
4. Lack of Emphasis on Outputs
Although designed to provide "output-oriented
programming", the emphasis is in fact on inputs. Output
oriented issues are the "four pillars" (readiness,
sustainability, modernization and force structure) as well
as joint capability and contingency management. Instead
the players in the PPBS are mired in procurement
documentation, budget hearings and manpower issues. These
are all input related. Until the players in the process
are freed up to focus efforts on output, they will be
forced to deal with the issues that are most pressing:
inputs. [Ref. 4:p. 502]
5. Length, Complexity, and Instability of the PPBS
Spread over a 15 month cycle, the phases of the
PPBS are overlapping and intertwining. Military decision
makers have responsibilities outside the realm of PPBS.
Time management requires them to devote attention where it
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is needed most (or perceived to be). This is part of the
reason that planning gets such cursory attention. [Ref.
4:p. 505]
C. MARINE CORPS POM ISSUES
The major weaknesses of the Marine Corps POM process
are, in fact, the criticisms levied against program
budgeting. In his assessment of budgeting, "The Politics
of the Budgeting Process", Aaron Wildavsky described
program budgeting as an attempt to "relate ends to means in
a comprehensive fashion". [Ref. 18 p. 135] Ironically,
program budgeting was seen as possessing characteristics
opposite those of the traditional budgeting approach:
Program budgeting is comprehensive and emphasizes policy
decisions whereas traditional budgeting is incremental,
focusing on pieces and "veiling" policy. Wildavsky
(pp. 135-138) summarized program budgeting with these
principal flaws:
a. This approach tends to decrease agreement between the
participants.
b. The burdens of calculation are markedly increased.
c. The outcomes or decisions of the process would be
different from those reached in the traditional
approach.
This prophetic synopsis took the position that the
likely consequences of program budgeting would be the
magnification of gains and losses to program advocates to
such an extent that conflict would reign and the "
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war of all against all" would be the likely result. [Ref.
18:p. 138]
Granted, this is a rather bleak forecast for this
"revolutionary" reform, but the parallels to the POM
process are worth examining. The goal of relating ends to
means on a comprehensive scale is a rather idealistic
approach to resource allocation. Given the fact that a
purely political body, Congress, makes final decisions on
defense budgets severely limits the prospects for success.
Although initially hailed as the solution to the
problems of all federal agencies, program budgeting (PPBS)
has survived only in the DoD. Perhaps the reason for its
longevity is, due to the DoD ' s majority interest of
discretionary dollars, program budgeting affords the
Congress the opportunity to scrutinize programs to a level
of detail unattainable by any other approach. That the
burdens of calculation have increased is evidenced by the
huge analytical staffs employed by Congress. [Ref. 17: p.
94] By keeping the PPBS for the DoD, Congress in effect
requires them to justify every program in a comprehensive,
means-ends fashion. Marine Corps POM initiatives are no
exception, and what this approach fosters is the present-
oriented emphasis that results in a futile planning phase.
The faults of the program approach are evidenced by the
Marine Corps ammunition initiative. Disagreements over the
amounts of PWR munitions are numerous. The utilization
rates developed by the Class V(W) methodology are hotly
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debated between the PWR monitors and the Requirements &
Programs Division. The burden of proof seems to be on the
few individuals responsible for the PWR. Regardless of
whether the arguments for increased ammunition dollars are
airtight, if Congress avoids the issue by cutting the
Procurement, Marine Corps appropriation and ammunition
requirements will suffer. Because the PWR is such an
elusive goal with numbers in flux from one year to the
next, when the budget is constrained, it is very hard to
convince decision makers that the attainment of proper
levels in the PWR is an urgent requirement. The top
priority goes to training ammunition (readiness) and until
it is adequately funded, funds for sustainability tend to
get less attention. Amounts for training are easier to
calculate whereas the PWR is very difficult to quantify,
thus the burdens of increased calculation become an
obstacle.
The cycle exists that when resources are available,
such as early in the Reagan administration, ammunition gets
respectable attention. Perhaps this is because most
present-oriented programs and "inputs" are adequately
funded and the opportunity presents itself to assist
neglected areas. Whether these prosperous budgets are
enough to close any "sustainability gap" that may have
grown is really never investigated. Without a standard or
goal to measure performance, the system lacks the direction
to self-correct. However, as soon as resources become
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tight, procurement and hence ammunition are the first areas
to look for cuts. Again, the balance between readiness
and sustainability tilts in favor of readiness and the
present.
The Marine Corps method of programming does have
strengths because of the small size of the service and its
stated reliance on the overall benefit to the Corps as a
criteria for allocation. However, because means-ends
programming is required, it suffers from the
aforementioned, inherent weaknesses.
The effects of these flaws are best illustrated by the
output "sustainability" and specifically a measure of it--
the PWR. The next section will examine the status of
ammunition and the ability of the U.S. to sustain its
forces in combat with adequate quantities of munitions.
D. AMMUNITION ISSUES
To make a force sustainable in munitions, a choice can
be made between two alternatives. First is the option to
maintain adequate stockpiles of ammunition (PWR) in the
belief that a short, intense conventional war will be
fought that either ends quickly or escalates into nuclear
war. The second choice is to maintain an industrial base
with the capability of supplying ammunition in sufficient
quantities before pre-war inventories are depleted.
What exists is a present-oriented strategy (PWR) and a
future oriented strategy (industrial base maintenance)
within the sustainability issue of ammunition.
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When discussing the problems of attaining the goals set
for the PWR at Headquarters, Marine Corps, the unanimous
opinion of the officers responsible for monitoring the PWR
was that there is a general assumption among decision
makers regarding the production of ammunition that is
incorrect: that ammunition is the first to get cut and the
last to "get well" because the production "faucet" can be
turned on if a bona fide need arises. Thus, there is no
reason to sacrifice hardware and current capability for
ammunition inventories. If the situation presents itself,
a source of ammunition will be found and utilized. This
section investigates this stockpile/industrial base trade-
off as it applies to ammunition.
The decision to achieve the right mix of reserves and
production capability is not an "either/or" situation.
Over-reliance on our nuclear capability to deter conflicts
of less-than-nuclear size invites adversaries to exploit
the scenarios one is least prepared to conduct. Small,
"low intensity" conflicts have to be met with the forces-
in-being. War reserves must be adequate to handle these
flare-ups, with the caveat that a low level conflict may
become a protracted, conventional war. In short, to
ensure there are no weaknesses for adversaries to exploit,
one must maintain forces capable of reacting to all levels
of conflict.
If one emphasizes the PWR, it should be understood that
this favors the "short war" philosophy and invites neglect
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of the capabilities required to counter protracted wars.
Conversely, neglecting the PWR and relying on the
industrial base to overcome shortages is a gamble that
assumes there is enough ammunition in inventory to sustain
the forces until industry can begin to take over
replenishment. This concept is referred to as "D-to-P",
meaning the inventory will last from the beginning of
hostilities (D-day) until production (P) takes over. [Ref.
19:p. 16]
The key to a successful "D-to-P" strategy is the
accurate estimation of wartime consumption rates. If these
rates are accurate, the computation of the PWR necessary to
sustain the forces for the D-to-P period is rather simple.
But how long is the D-to-P period? This is based on an
estimation of the industry's ability to surge to wartime
production rates.
It becomes evident that to be "ready", one requires an
adequate PWR and a capable industrial base. The current
"gaps" between PWR and industrial base production vary
between different types of munitions. Some types may be
very close to the 60 day goal and easily "surged" while
others are considerably less than 60 days and may require a
longer time period until surge capability is achieved.
The "D—to-P" concept was used during the 1950' s and
1960's, but was scrapped in favor of the "D plus 6"
concept. This strategy holds the military responsible for
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the first six months of a conflict and industry would
sustain the forces from D plus six months on. [Ref. 19: p.
14]
In summary, the industrial base is a direct measure of
the nation's economic power, which is critical to its
success in a major conflict. If the cost of buying and
maintaining an adequate PWR is too large during shrinking
budget cycles, then the industrial base must be capable of
compensating for the shortfalls in inventory and vice
versa. As long as no gap exists, sustainability is
achieved. However, this would call for a link between
government and industry that does not currently exist.
The DoD has become more active in recent years in
industrial preparedness planning, but the vital connection
with industry is still missing. The general opinion of
industry is that government is not serious about surge
planning, evidenced by a lack of funds, confusing data on
priorities and the lack of a centralized focal point for
this type of planning in government. [Ref. 20: p. 26]
Thus, the "shock waves" of poor planning are felt at
the output level of the PPBS. This chapter has shown that
the environment of the PPBS has flaws that affect first the
programming process (POM) and thereby the output
"sustainability". Chapter V will discuss the author's
conclusions and some possible recommendations that may
improve this process.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. GENERAL
The issues surrounding ammunition sustainability in the
Marine Corps as an output of the PPBS have several sources.
To best understand the problems that plague the ammunition
initiative, this thesis has addressed the PPBS environment
as a whole, the Marine Corps ammunition requirement
generation process, the POM process in the Marine Corps and
the major criticisms leveled against these items.
Conclusions about this topic fall into two general
categories: those that deal with processes and those that
pertain specifically to ammunition.
B. PROCESS RELATED CONCLUSIONS
These conclusions are drawn from material that relates
to the PPBS, requirement generation and the Marine Corps
POM.
1. PPBS Related Conclusions
The PPBS was instituted to assist an administration
in gaining the maximum capability for the fewest dollars
during an era that was driven by a perceived need to build
up conventional forces along with an ongoing increase in
nuclear forces. The ills that accompanied this experiment
in program budgeting have since made their presence known.
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The PPBS ". . .has come to be seen as a strategy in
itself, with less focus within the organization on the
nature of the competition." [Ref. 21:p. 11] Because of
its focus on budgeting and the present, the PPBS is
"dominated by platform considerations and constrained by
its nature to describe the future. . .in terms of
replacement, modernization, and retirement of major
hardware items." [Ref. 21:p. 11]
Two factors are undeniably present in the future of
resource allocation decisions: the national debt will
dominate the process and the pressures of increased social
spending will increase as our baby boom population ages.
With these factors in mind, the allocation of funds for
defense spending will be more constrained than in the past
and, at the very least, will get even more scrutiny. The
PPBS, as it currently operates, will not facilitate the
most efficient use of these resources. With programming
and budgeting driving the process, the likely outcome will
be to maintain current force sizes and delay vital R&D and
modernization. [Ref. 22:p. 57]
Much attention has been devoted to the lack of a
comprehensive strategic goal in national security policy.
While it is apparent that many of the weaknesses of the
PPBS can be traced to this root cause, correcting this flaw
will not solve all of the problems of the PPBS. Congress
has exhibited a stop-and-go pattern of defense spending
that reacts to the presence or absence of a crisis
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situation. Because it is a political body, Congress acts
according to the sentiments of constituents. National
security is too important to be so reliant on public
opinion. This situation is the cause of the erratic
spending record on defense.
For the PPBS to work efficiently, it must be given
a goal and the formal process followed, with planning
driving the system.
To combat the ill effects of stop-and -go spending,
a stable percentage of GNP should be devoted to defense.
This amount or percentage should be taken out of the hands
of Congress once it is decided what it should be. If
Congress wants to have more to say about discretionary
spending, then it should increase the size of this category
by digging into some of the entitlements that exist. Only
with the assurance that slow, steady growth will be
maintained is it possible for planning to be productive in
the long run.
In the absence of any major structural changes to
the PPBS or defense spending policy, the current emphasis
on the short-term will continue. The focus will remain on
hardware and platforms because they are quantifiable and,
although a near-term objective, an achievable goal
nonetheless.
One of the expected ills of program budgeting was
increased burdens of calculation. When referring to
calculations, one is basically referring to analysis.
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Most analysis takes place during the programming phase of
the PPBS, or the POM process. The next section discusses
conclusions regarding analysis and the POM process.
2 . POM Related Conclusions
The Marine Corps POM process contains all the
requisite checks and balances to ensure that resources are
allocated efficiently given the assumption that planning is
the catalyst of the process. However, as has been
discussed, the PPBS is short sighted and budget oriented.
In his memorandum on analysis in general, James Schlesinger
pointed out the following:
Truth becomes only one of a number of conflicting
objectives and, sad to relate, oftentimes a secondary
one. . .unfortunately, the emphasis tends to shift to a
search for the winning argument as opposed to the correct
conclusion. [Ref. 23:p. 1]
This problem is especially evident in the programming
phase. With short (three to four years) tours as
participants in the POM process, most officers do not
measure their performance in relation to the vague
"outputs" that can barely be defined much less quantified.
To achieve something measurable in a short period
of time, energy gets directed at the POM and subsequently
the budget. Hardware translates into accomplishment;
tangible evidence that a considerable amount of effort was
expended successfully.
But what about the support necessary to translate
this new hardware into useful capability? The ammunition
in the PWR is a perfect example of an initiative that lacks
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the glamour and "sex appeal" to command a large advocacy in
the POM process. Sustainability is also intangible in
many respects.
Ammunition, and thus sustainability, along with
other unappealing yet vital elements of national security
would not be as subject to neglect if the PPBS worked
properly. Again, quoting Schlesinger:
Analysis is a useful tool, but it is only a tool. It
would be a mistake to turn over a new proverbial leaf--
and generally find fault with tools rather than
craftsmen. [Ref. 23:p. 2]
Therefore, the author does not fault the Marine
Corps POM process for methods it uses to prioritize and
allocate resources. Every effort is made to efficiently
match available resources with legitimate objectives. The
breakdown comes as a result of the lack of long range
strategic planning and goals. The scramble for resources
is a characteristic of programmed budgeting, and a symptom
of the faults that lie with the PPBS.
3. Ammunition Requirements Related Conclusions
The issues that arise regarding rates of ammunition
usage during combat are difficult to resolve. It is hard
to make this type of estimate. If experience is any
indication of the future, U.S. forces usually expend more
ammunition than was predicted. Since the Marine Corps
depends on its readiness, it would seem prudent to have
more than required in the PWR.
Since the rates generated by the Class V(W)
methodology determine the ultimate amounts of munitions in
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the PWR, this model warrants close scrutiny. The output
of this model immediately gets translated into dollars, and
are often judged on that basis too quickly. So much
depends on these figures that the Marine Corps can not
afford to judge them based solely on their affect on the
bottom line of the budget.
Instead, the amounts generated by the model should
be accepted as valid and proven to be incorrect if faults
are found within the methodology. Again, if
sustainability were recognized as being on an equal footing
with the other "pillars of defense" this issue may never
arise.
In the same manner that U.S. defense spending is
rendered inefficient by stop-and-go spending trends, the
Procurement, Marine Corps appropriation is also erratic.
Without sustained, gradual growth in procurement, and thus
ammunition spending, the PWR will suffer because training
requirements will have priority over the PWR. To
adequately prepare for future sustainability, monitors of
the PWR must be able to plan ahead. The current trends in
procurement spending do not permit this.
C. AMMUNITION RELATED CONCLUSIONS
The missions of the Marine Corps are present-oriented
and require it to be, above all other attributes, ready to
go to war. Because this is true, the Marine Corps
concentrates much of its resources towards the "short war"
philosophy. The industrial base and its maintenance are
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future-oriented, sustainability issues. Because of this,
the Marine Corps should not be overly concerned with surge
capability of munitions producers. When the Marine Corps
is called upon to perform a mission, it will probably do so
with the forces and munitions it possesses at the time.
The PWR, although a sustainability issue, is not future
oriented. The PWR enhances the Marine Corps posture for
the short war scenario. If this perspective is utilized,
the Marine Corps should view the PWR as an issue vital to
its performance and not as a long range, "nice to have but
not necessary" luxury.
The adequate funding of the PWR maintains the Corps
'
ability to be a serious threat in the short war scenario.
To rely on a level of sustainability too far below the 60
days of ammunition mandated in the DG may relegate the
Marine Corps to participation only at the "low intensity"
level of conflict.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
As the environment of constrained resources continues,
and under the assumption that the PPBS will remain as the
DoD ' s resource allocation process, the author feels that
there are certain actions that could make the system more
flexible and responsive to ammunition sustainability.
1 . PPBS Related Recommendations
Without constant levels of defense spending, the
planning phase will remain the weaker of the three phases
of the PPBS. However, steps can be taken to make more
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efficient use of resources when the political climate
favors defense spending. Stop-and-go spending is most
inefficient when planners use constant levels to estimate
future allocations. This is a costly assumption. What
should be assumed is that defense spending will continue to
be erratic. When the need arises, such as in a crisis,
the Defense Department should have strategies to respond to
the sudden availability of funds instead of reacting at the
last moment and thereby encouraging inefficient spending.
Also, adherence to the 60 days of ammunition
requirement in the DG should be enforced and not altered.
If this SecDef target is changed either in the number of
days or the date, the PWR will suffer even more than it
does now. Once the participants in the PPBS know that an
objective is real and not ambiguous, the incentive will
exist to achieve it.
2. POM Related Recommendations
The Marine Corps POM process achieves the right mix
of analysis and subjective judgement. The participants,
although acutely aware of the need for balance, tend to be
biased toward present oriented hardware initiatives.
Although this is common to program budgeting in general, it
should be analyzed and discussed to ensure the interests of
the Marine Corps are best served by this approach.
If current threats appear to outweigh future ones,
this is the correct method of preparation. But if the
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present is overemphasized, the service is committing itself
to being reactive instead of proactive.
3 . Ammunition Related Recommendations
Higher priority should be given to ammunition in
the prioritization process. Readiness is directly affected
by ammunition expenditures, whether for training or for the
PWR.
If the Marine Corps is committed to a low intensity
conflict, ammunition can be obtained from other sources if
required. But the Marine Corps needs the capability to
enter combat with its own resources regardless of the level
of the conflict.
Since the procurement appropriation absorbs the
largest share of budget cuts, ammunition is always at risk.
However, ammunition should not be automatically cut. If
ammunition were perceived as readiness related, which it
is, it should fare better.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
As recommendations for further study, the author
believes the following areas could be investigated:
1. Class V(W) Methodology
A thorough investigation into the model used to
generate ammunition requirements would be beneficial. By
tracking the development of the various versions of this
model along with the underlying assumptions of each
iteration, a clearer understanding of why these rates are
disputed could be achieved.
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2. Marine Corps POM Process
Because each service is free to program resources
in the manner it feels is best, a comparison between the




Procurement, Marine Corps Appropriation
An investigation into the trends in procurement
spending in the Marine Corps may reveal more of the reasons
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